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Abstract
Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed learning framework that can deal with the distributed issue
in machine learning and still guarantee high learning performance. However, it is impractical that all
users will sacrifice their resources to join the FL algorithm. This motivates us to study the incentive
mechanism design for FL. In this paper, we consider a FL system that involves one base station (BS)
and multiple mobile users. The mobile users use their own data to train the local machine learning
model, and then send the trained models to the BS, which generates the initial model, collects local
models and constructs the global model. Then, we formulate the incentive mechanism between the BS
and mobile users as an auction game where the BS is an auctioneer and the mobile users are the sellers.
In the proposed game, each mobile user submits its bids according to the minimal energy cost that
the mobile users experiences in participating in FL. To decide winners in the auction and maximize
social welfare, we propose the primal-dual greedy auction mechanism. The proposed mechanism can
guarantee three economic properties, namely, truthfulness, individual rationality and efficiency. Finally,
numerical results are shown to demonstrate the performance effectiveness of our proposed mechanism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, according to the report of International Data Corporation, there are nearly 3 billions
smart-phones on the world [1], [2], which generate a huge amount of personal data. Nowadays,
mobile devices equipped with specialized hardware architectures and computing engines can
handle the machine learning problem effectively. In addition, the application of machine learning
techniques in mobile devices has grown rapidly. Furthermore, due to the limitation of wireless
communication resources and privacy protection problem, the conventional central machine
learning techniques, which upload all data of mobile devices to the central sever, are becoming
less attractive. For this reason, federated learning (FL) is promoted, which is implemented
distributively at the edge of the network [3], [4]. In FL, mobile users can collaboratively train a
global model using their own local data. Mobile users compute the updates of the current global
model, and then send back the updates to the central server for aggregation and build a new
global model. This process is repeated until an accuracy level of the global learning model is
achieved. By this way, FL can preserve the personal information and data of mobile users. In
addition, FL will significantly promote services that have unparalleled versatile data collection
and model training on a large scale. Take the app Ware as an example. This application can
help the users in avoiding heavy traffic roads, but users have to share their own locations to the
server. If FL is applied to this app, users only need to send the intermediate gradient values
to the server rather than the raw data [5]. Last but not least, the development of mobile edge
computing provides an immense exposure to extract the benefits of FL [6], [7].
In spite of the above mentioned benefits of FL, there are remaining challenges of having an
efficient FL framework. Firstly, data samples per mobile device are small to train a high-quality
learning model so a large number of mobile users are needed to ensure cooperation. In addition,
the mobile users who join the learning process are independent and uncontrollable. Here, mobile
users may not be willing to participate in the learning due to the energy cost incurred by model
training. In other words, the base station (BS), which generates the global model, has to stimulate
the mobile users for participation. Moreover, because the wireless resource is limited, the BS
needs to allocate the resources reasonably to avoid the congestion, guarantee the model training
performance and optimize the total utilities of the BS and mobile users.
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To deal with the above challenges, in this paper, we model the FL service between the BS
and mobile users as an auction game in which the BS is buyer and mobile users are sellers. In
particular, the BS first initiates and announces a FL task. When each mobile user receives the FL
task information, they decide the amount of resources required to participate in the model training.
After that, each mobile user submits a bid, which includes the required amount of resource,
local accuracy, and the corresponding energy cost, to the BS. Moreover, the BS plays the role of
auctioneer to decide the winners among mobile users as well as clear payment for the winning
mobile users. In addition, the auction used in this paper is a type of combinational auction
[8], [9] since each mobile user can bid for combinations of resources. However, the proposed
auction mechanism allows mobile users sharing the resources at the BS, which is different
from the conventional combinatorial auction. The proposed mechanism directly determines the
trading rules between the buyer (BS) and sellers (mobile users) and motivates the mobile users
to participate in the model training. Compared with other incentive mechanism approaches (e.g.,
contract theory [10]) in which the service market is a monopoly market, where mobile users
can only decide whether or not to accept the contracts, the proposed auction enables mobile
users to bids any combinations of resources. Moreover, the proposed auction mechanism can
simultaneously provide truthfulness and individual rationality. An auction mechanism is truthful if
a bidder’s utility does not increase when that bidder makes other bidding strategies, rather than the
true value. Revealing the true value is a dominant strategy for each participating user regardless
of what strategies other users use [11]. An absent-truthfulness auction mechanism could leave
the door to possible market manipulation and produce inferior results [12]. Additionally, if the
value of any bidder is non-negative, an auction process will ensure individual rationality.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose an auction framework for the wireless FL services market. Then, we present the
bidding cost in every user’s bid submitted to the BS. From the perspective of mobile users,
each mobile user make optimal decisions on the amount of resources and local accuracy so
that the energy cost is minimized while delay requirement of FL is satisfied.
• From the perspective of the BS, we formulate the winner selection problem in the auction
game as the social welfare maximization problem which is a NP-hard problem. We propose
a primal-dual greedy algorithm to deal with the NP-hard problem in selecting the winning
users and critical value based payment. We also proposed auction mechanism is truthful,
individual rational and computational efficient.
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• Finally, we carry out the numerical study to show that a proposed auction mechanism can
guarantee the approximation factor of the integrality to the maximal welfare that is derived
by the optimal solution and outperforms compared with baseline.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the related work. The
system model is introduced in Section III. We describe the problem formulation in Section IV.
We present the auction-based resource purchasing mechanism in Section V. Simulation results
are given in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Due to the resource constraints and the heterogeneity of mobile users, some focus issues are
resource allocation, client selection and incentive mechanism to improve the efficiency of FL.
The authors in [5] posed the joint learning and transmission energy minimization problem for
FL. In this paper, all users upload their learning model to the BS in a synchronous manner.
The work in [13] also considered the latency and energy consumption minimization problem for
the case of asynchronous transmission. The work in [14] explored the problem of reducing the
learning loss function by considering packet errors over wireless links, but this research ignored
the computation delay of the local learning model. In [15], the authors suggested energy-efficient
strategies for allocating bandwidth and scheduling while at the same time, guaranteeing learning
efficiency. The derived optimal policies allocate more bandwidth to those scheduled devices
with weaker channels or lower computing capacities, which are the bottlenecks of synchronized
model updates in FL.
However, the works in [5], [13]–[15] overlooked the problem of client selection to build a
high-quality machine learning model. The authors in [16] designed a protocol called FedCS. The
FedCS protocol has a resource request phase to gather information such as computing power
and wireless channel states from a subset of randomly selected clients, i.e., FL workers, that
are able to finish the local training punctually. A q-FedAvg training algorithm for selecting the
client by the computational power was proposed in [17]. This proposed algorithm in [17] can
improve the training efficiency and solve the fairness issue. The study in [18] recommended
combining deep reinforcement learning (DRL) and FL frameworks with mobile edge systems
to optimize computing, caching and communication. The study in [19] jointly considered the
device selection and beamforming fast global model aggregation. They used the principle of
over-the-air computation to exploit signal superposition multiple access channels.
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Concerning the incentive mechanism design, the authors in [20] proposed a Stackelberg game
model to investigate the interactions between the server and the mobile devices in a cooperative
relay communication network. The mobile devices determine the price per unit of data for
individual profit maximization, while the server chooses the size of training data to optimize
its own profit. The authors in [10] studied the block-chained FL architecture and proposed the
contract theory based payment mechanism to incentivize the mobile devices to take part in the
FL. However, [10] largely provided a latency analysis for the related applications. The work in
[21] designed and analyzed a novel crowdsourcing framework to enable FL. In [21], a two-stage
Stackelberg game model was adopted to jointly study the utility maximization of the participating
clients and multi-access edge computing (MEC) server interacting via an application interface
to construct a high-quality learning model. In [22], a Stackelberg game for FL in IoT was
proposed to tackle the challenge of incentivizing people to join the FL by contributing their
computational power and data. For the cases where the knowledge of participants’ decisions
and accurate contribution evaluation are accessible, the Nash Equilibrium was derived, and an
algorithm based on DRL was built to unknown the knowledge of participants’ decisions and
accurate contribution evaluation for the cases. However, both [21] and [22] studied only the
uniform pricing scheme for participants.
Different from the Stackelberg game and contract theory, the auction mechanism allows mobile
users to actively report its cost. Therefore, the BS is capable of understanding their status and
requests adequately. [23] adopted the multi-dimensional procurement auction to motivate nodes
to participate in FL. However, there exist some differences between [23] and our work: (a)
[23] the bids submitted by edge node clarifies the combination of resources and the expected
payment, which is based on the private cost parameters while in our work, the bid declares the
combination of resource, local accuracy and the cost, which is determined based on latency and
energy cost models; (b) the winner selection in [23] based on the scoring function announced
by the aggregator while in our work, winners are selected in order to optimize social welfare
and ensure resource efficiency.
III. SYSTEM MODEL: FEDERATED LEARNING SERVICES MARKET
A. Preliminary of Federated Learning
Consider a cellular network in which one BS and a set N of N users cooperatively perform
a FL algorithm for model learning, as shown in Fig. 1. Each user n has sn local data samples.
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1. Federated Learning task
2. Bids 
3. Winners list & payment list
4. Global model
5. Updated local models
6. Payment
Global Model
Local Model
Local Model
Local Model
Auction phases
Federated learning phases
[sub-channel, antenna, local accuracy, cost]
Set of mobile users
Fig. 1: System model.
Each data set sn = {ank, bnk,1≤k≤sn} where ank is an input and bnk is its corresponding output.
The FL model trained by the dataset of each user is called the local FL model, while the FL
model at the BS aggregates the local model from all users as the global FL model. We define a
vector ω as the model parameter. We also introduce the loss function ln(ω, ank, bnk) that captures
the FL performance over input vector ank and output bnk. The loss function may be different,
depending on the different learning tasks. The total loss function of user n will be
Ln(ω) =
1
sn
sn∑
k=1
ln(ω, ank, bnk). (1)
Then, the learning model is the minimizer of the following global loss function minimization
problem
min
ω
L(ω) =
N∑
n=1
sn
S
Ln(ω) =
1
S
N∑
n=1
sn∑
k=1
ln(ω, ank, bnk), (2)
where S =
∑N
n=1 sn is the total data samples of all users.
To solve the problem in (2), we adopt the FL algorithm of [24]. The algorithm uses an iterative
approach that requires a number of global iterations (i.e., communication rounds) to achieve a
global accuracy level. In each global iteration, there are interactions between the users and BS.
Specifically, at a given global iteration t, users receive the global parameter ωt, users computes
OLn(ωt),∀n and send it to the BS. The BS computes [13]
OL(ωt) = 1
N
N∑
n=1
OLn(ωt), (3)
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and then broadcasts the value of OL(ωt) to all participating users. Each participating user n will
use local training data sn to solve the local FL problem is defined as
min
φn
Gn(ωt, φn)
= Ln(ω
t + φn)−
(
OLn(ωt)−$OL(ωt)
)T
φn,
(4)
where φn represents the difference between global FL parameter and local FL parameter for
user n. Each participating user n uses the gradient method to solve (4) with local accuracy εn
that characterizes the quality of the local solution, and produces the output φn that satisfies
Gn(ωt, φn)− Gn(ωt, φ∗n) < εn(Gn(ωt, 0)− Gn(ωt, φ∗n)). (5)
Solving (4) also takes multiple local iterations to achieve a particular local accuracy. Then each
user n sends the local parameter φn to the BS. Next, the BS aggregates the local parameters
from the users and computes
ωt+1 = ωt +
1
N
N∑
n=1
φtn, (6)
and broadcasts the value to all users, which is used for next iteration t + 1. This process is
repeated until the global accuracy γ of (2) is obtained.
With the assumption on Ln(ω), the general lower bound on the number of global iterations
is depends on local accuracy ε and the global accuracy γ as [13]:
Ig(γ, ε) =
C1 log(1/γ)
1− ε , (7)
where the local accuracy measures the quality of the local solution as described in the preceding
paragraphs.
In (7), we observe that a very high local accuracy (small ε) can significantly boost the global
accuracy γ for a fixed number of global iterations Ig at the BS to solve the global problem.
However, each user n has to spend excessive resources in terms of local iterations, I ln to attain
a small value of εn. The lower bound on the number of local iterations needed to achieve local
accuracy εn is derived as [13]
I ln(εn) = ϑn log
(
1
εn
)
, (8)
where ϑn > 0 is a parameter choice of user n that depends on parameters of Ln(ω) [13]. In
this paper, we normalize ϑn = 1. Therefore, to address this trade-off, the BS can setup an
economic interaction environment to motivate the participating users to enhance local accuracy
εn. Correspondingly, with the increased payment, the participating users are motivated to attain
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better local accuracy εn (i.e., smaller values), which as noted in (7) can improve the global
accuracy γ for a fixed number of iterations Ig of the BS to solve the global problem. In this
case, the corresponding performance bound in (7) for the heterogeneous responses n can be
updated to capture the statistical and system-level heterogeneity considering the worst response
of the participating users as:
Ig(γ, εn) =
$ log(1/γ)
1−maxn εn ,∀n. (9)
B. Computation and Communication Models for Federated Learning
The contributed computation resource that user n contributes for local model training is
denoted as fn. Then, cn denotes the number of CPU cycles needed for the user n to perform one
sample of data in local training. Thus, energy consumption of the user for one local iteration is
presented as
Ecomn (fn) = ζcnsnf
2
n, (10)
where ζ is the effective capacitance parameter of computing chipset for user n. The computing
time of a local iteration at the user n is denoted by
T compn =
cnsn
fn
. (11)
It is noted that the uplink from the users to the BS is used to transmit the parameters of the local
FL model while the downlink is used for transmitting the parameters of the global FL model.
In this paper, we just consider the uplink bandwidth allocation due to the relation of the uplink
bandwidth and the cost that user experiences during learning a global model. We consider the
uplink transmission of an OFDMA-based cellular system. A set of B = {1, 2, ..., B} subchannels
each with bandwidth W . Moreover, the BS is equipped with A antennas and each user equipment
has a single antenna (i.e., multi-user MIMO). We assume A to be large (e.g., several hundreds)
to achieve massive MIMO effect which scales up traditional MIMO by orders of magnitude.
Massive MIMO uses spatial-division multiplexing. The achievable uplink data rate of mobile
user n is expressed as [25]
rn = bnW log2
(
1 +
(An − 1)pnhn
bnWN0
)
, (12)
where pn is the transmission power of user n, hn is the channel gain of peer to peer link between
user and the BS, N0 is the background noise, An is the number of antennas the BS assigns to
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user n, and bn is the number of sub-channels that user n uses to transmit the local model update
to the BS.
We denote σ as the data size of a local model update and it is the same for all users. Therefore,
the transmission time of a local model update is
T comn (pn, An, bn) =
σ
rn
. (13)
To transmit local model updates in a global iteration, the user n uses the amount of energy given
as
Ecom(pn, fn, An, bn) = T
compn =
σpn
rn
. (14)
Hence, the total time of one global iteration for user n is denoted as
T toln (pn, fn, An, bn, εn)
= log
(
1
εn
)
T compn (fn) + T
com
n (pn, An, bn).
(15)
Therefore, the total energy consumption of a user n in one global iteration is denoted as follows
Etoln (pn, fn, An, bn, εn)
= log
(
1
εn
)
Ecompn (fn) + E
com
n (pn, An, bn).
(16)
C. Auction Model
As described in Fig. 1, the BS first initializes the global network model. Then, the BS
announces the auction rule and advertises the FL task to the mobile users. The mobile users
then report their bids. Here, mobile user n submits a set of In of bids to the BS. A bid ∆ni
denotes the ith bid submitted by the mobile user n. Bid bni consists of the resource (sub-channel
number bni, antenna number Ani, local accuracy level εni) and the claimed cost vni for the model
training. Each mobile user n has its own discretion to determine its true cost Vni, which will be
presented in Section IV. Let xni be a binary variable indicating the bid ∆ni wins or not. After
receiving all the bids from mobile users, the BS decides winners and then allocates the resource
to the winning mobile users. The winning mobile users join the FL and receive the payment
after finishing the training model.
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IV. DECIDING MOBILE USERS’S BID
To transmit the local model update to the BS, mobile users need sub-channels and antennas
resources. However, given the maximum tolerable time of FL, there is a correlation between
resource and corresponding energy cost. In this section, we present the way mobile users decide
bids. Specially, for bid ∆ni, mobile user n calculates transmission power pni, computation
resource fni and cost vni corresponding to a given sub-channel number bni and antenna number
Ani. However, the process to decide mobile users’ bid is the same for every submitted bids.
Thus, we remove the bid index i in this section. The energy cost of mobile user n is defined as
P1 : min
fn,pn,An,bn,εn
In0E
tol
n (pn, fn, An, bn, εn) (17a)
s.t. In0 T
tol
n (pn, fn, An, bn, εn) ≤ Tmax, (17b)
fn ∈ [fminn , fmaxn ], (17c)
pn ∈ (0, pmaxn ], (17d)
εn ≤ (0, 1], (17e)
An ∈ (0, Amaxn ], (17f)
bn ∈ (0, bmaxn ], (17g)
where fmaxn and p
max
n are the maximum local computation capacity and maximum transmit power
of mobile user n, respectively. Amaxn and b
max
n are the maximum antenna and maximum sub-
channel that mobile user n can request in each bid, respectively. Amaxn and b
max
n are chosen by
mobile user n. In0 =
C1 log(1/γ)
1−εn is the lower bound of the number global iterations corresponding
to local accuracy εn. Note that the cost to the mobile user cannot be the same over iterations.
However, to make the problem more tractable, we consider minimizing the approximated cost
rather than the actual cost, similar to approach in [21], [26]. Constraint (17b) indicates delay
requirement of FL task.
According to P1, the maximum number of antennas and sub-channels are always energy
efficient, i.e., the optimal antenna is An = Amaxn , bn = b
max
n and ε
∗
n, p
∗
n, f
∗
n are the optimal
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 11
solution to:
P2 : min
fn,pn,εn
In0E
tol
n (pn, fn, εn)
s.t. In0 T
tol
n (pn, fn, εn) ≤ Tmax,
fn ∈ [fminn , fmaxn ],
εn ∈ (0, 1],
pn ∈ (0, pmaxn ].
(18)
Because of the non convexity of P2, it is challenging to obtain the global optimal solution. To
overcome the challenge, an iterative algorithm with low complexity is proposed in the following
subsection.
A. Iterative Algorithm
The proposed iterative algorithm basically involves two steps in each iteration. To obtain the
optimal, we first solve (P2) with fixed εn, and then εn is updated based on the obtained fn, pn in
the previous step. In the first step, we consider the first case when εn is fixed, and P2 becomes
P3 : min
fn,pn,εn
In0E
tol
n (pn, fn, εn)
s.t. In0 T
tol
n (pn, fn, εn) ≤ Tmax,
fn ∈ [fminn , fmaxn ],
pn ∈ (0, pmaxn ].
(19)
P3 can be decomposed into two sub-problems as follows.
1) Optimization of Uplink Transmission Power: Each mobile user assigns its transmission
power by solving the following problem:
P3a : min
pn
f(pn)
s.t. In0 (f(pn)/σ + T
comp
n ) ≤ Tmax,
pn ∈ (0, pmaxn ],
fn, εn are given.
(20)
where f(pn) = σpn
bnW log2(1+
(An−1)pnhn
bnWN0
)
. Note that f(pn) is quasiconvex in the domain [27]. A
general approach to the quasiconvex optimization problem is the bisection method, which solves
a convex feasibility problem each time [28]. However, solving convex feasibility problems by
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Algorithm 1: Optimal Uplink Power Transmission
1 Calculate φ(pmaxn )
2 Calculate pminn so that T
t
n(p
min
n ) = Tmax
3 if φ(pmaxn < 0) then
4 p∗n = p
max
n
5 else
6 p1 = max(0, p
min
n ) and p2 = p
max
n
7 while (p2 − p1 ≤ ) do
8 pu = (p1 + p1)/2
9 if φ(pu) ≤ 0 then
11 p1 = pu
12 else
14 p2 = pu
15 end
16 end
17 p∗n = (p1 + p2)/2
18 end
an interior cutting-plane method requires O(κ2/α2) iterations, where κ is the dimension of the
problem [27]. On the other hand, we have
f ′(pn) =
σ log2(1 + θnpnhn) +
σpnθnhn
ln 2(1+θnpnhn)
bnW (log(1 + θnpnhn))2
, (21)
where θn =
(An−1)
WN0
. Then, we have
φ(pn) = σ log2(1 + θnpnhn) +
σpnθnhn
ln 2(1 + θnpnhn)
(22)
is a monotonically increasing transcendental function and negative at the starting point pn = 0
[27]. Therefore, in order to obtain the optimal power allocation pn as shown in Algorithm 1,
we follow a low-complexity bisection method by calculating φ(pn) rather than solving a convex
feasibility problem each time.
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Algorithm 2: Optimal Local Accuracy
1 Initialize εn = ε
(0)
n , set j = 0
2 repeat
3 Calculate ε∗n =
α1
(ln 2)ξj
4 Update ξ(j+1) = γ1 log2(1/εn)+γ2
εn
5 Set j = j + 1
6 until |H(ξ(n+1))|/|H(ξ(n))| < 2;
2) Optimization of CPU cycle frequency and number of antennas::
P3b : min
fn
In0 log
(
1
εn
)
ζcnsnf
2
n
s.t. In0
(
log
(
1
εn
)
cnsn
fn
+ T comn
)
≤ Tmax,
fn ∈ [fminn , fmaxn ],
pn, εn are given.
(23)
P3b is the convex problem, so we can solve it by any convex optimization tool.
In the second step, P2 can be simplified by using fn and pn calculated in the first step as:
P4 : min
εn
γ1 log2(1/εn) + γ2
1− εn (24a)
s.t. T toln ≤ Tmax, (24b)
where γ1 = aEcompn and γ2 = aE
com
n . The constraint (24b) is equivalent to T
com
n ≤ ϑ(εn),
where ϑ(εn) = 1−εnm Tmax +
cnsn log2 εn
fn
. We have ϑ(εn)′′ < 0, and therefore, ϑ(εn) is a concave
function. Thus, constraint (24b) can be equivalent transformed to εminn ≤ εn ≤ εmaxn , where
ϑ(εminn ) = ϑ(ε
max
n ) = T
com
n . Therefore, εn is the optimal solution to
P5 : min
εn
γ1 log2(1/εn) + γ2
1− εn
s.t. εminn ≤ εn ≤ εmaxn .
(25)
Obviously, the objective function of P5 has a fractional in nature, which is generally difficult
to solve. According to [13], [29], solving P5 is equivalent to finding the root of the nonlinear
function H(ξ) defined as follows
H(ξ) = min
εminn ≤εn≤εmaxn
γ1 log2(1/εn) + γ2 − ξ(1− εn) (26)
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Algorithm 3: Iterative Algorithm
1 Initialize a feasible solution pn, fn, εn and set j = 0.
2 repeat
3 With ε(j)n obtain the optimal p
(j+1)
n , f
(j+1)
n of problem
4 With p(j+1)n , f
(j+1)
n obtain the optimal ε
(j+1)
n of problem
5 Set j = j + 1
6 until Objective value of P2 converges;
Function H(ξ) with fixed ξ is convex. Therefore, the optimal solution εn can be obtained by
setting the first-order derivative of H(ξ) to zero, which leads to the optimal solution is ε∗n =
γ1
(ln 2ξ)
.
Thus, similar to [13], problem P5 can be solved by using the Dinkelbach method in [29] (shown
as Algorithm 2).
The algorithm that solves problems P2 is given in Algorithm 3, iteratively solving problems
P3 and P4. Since the optimal solution of problem P3 and P4 is obtained in each step, the
objective value of problem P2 is non-increasing in each step. Moreover, the objective value of
problem P2 is lower bounded by zero. Thus, Algorithm 3 always converges to a local optimal
solution.
B. Complexity Analysis
To solve the general energy-efficient resource allocation problem P2 using Algorithm 3, the
major complexity in each step lies in solving problems P3 and P4. To solve problem P3, the
complexity is O(Le log2(1/1)), where 1 is the accuracy of solving P3 with the bisection
method and Le is the number of iterations for optimizing fn and pn. To solve problem P4,
the complexity is O(log2(1/2)) with accuracy 2 by using the Dinkelbach method. As a result,
the total complexity of the proposed Algorithm 3 is HeS, where He is the number of iterations
for problems P3 and P4 and S is equal to O(Le log2(1/1)) +O(log2(1/2)).
After deciding the bids, the mobile users submit bids to the BS. The following section describes
the auction mechanism between the BS and mobile users for selecting winners, allocating
bandwidth and deciding on payment.
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V. AUCTION MECHANISM BETWEEN BS AND MOBILE USERS
A. Problem Formulation
In bid ∆ni that mobile user n submits to the BS includes the number of subchannels bni, the
number of antennas Ani, local accuracy ni, and claimed cost vni. The utility of one bid is the
difference between the payment gni and the real cost Vni.
Uni =
gni − Vni, if bid ∆ni wins,0, otherwise. (27)
The payment that the BS pays for winning bids is
∑
n,i gni. As we described in Section III-A,
high local accuracy will significantly improve the global accuracy for a fixed number of global
iterations. The utility of the BS is the difference between the BS’s satisfaction level and the
payment for mobile users. The satisfaction level of the BS to bid ∆ni is measured based on the
local accuracy that mobile user n can provide in the ith bid and is defined as follows
χni = τεni. (28)
Thus, the total utilities of the system or the social welfare is∑
n,i
(χni − vni)xni. (29)
If mobile users truthfully submit their cost, Vni = vni, we have the social welfare maximization
problem defined as follows:
P6 : max
x
∑
n,i
(χni − vni)xni (30a)
s.t.
∑
n
xnibni ≤ Bmax, (30b)∑
n
xniAni ≤ Amax, (30c)∑
i
xni ≤ 1,∀n, (30d)
xni = {0, 1}, (30e)
where (30b) and (30c) indicate the bandwidth resource (i.e., sub-channels) and the antennas
limitation constraints of the BS, respectively. Then, (30d) shows that a mobile user can win at
most one bid and (30e) is the binary constraint that presents whether bid ∆ni wins or not.
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Problem P6 is a minimization knapsack problem, which is known to be NP-hard. This implies
that no algorithm is able to find out the optimal solution of P6 in polynomial time. It is also
known that a mechanism with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payment rule is truthful only when
the resource allocation is optimal. Hence, using VCG payment directly is unsuitable due to the
problem P6 is computationally intractable. To deal with the NP-hard problem, we proposed the
primal-dual based greedy algorithm. The following economic properties are desired.
Truthfulness: An auction mechanism is truthful if and only if for every bidder n can get the
highest utility when it reports true value.
Individual Rational: If each mobile user reports its true information (i.e., cost and local
accuracy), the utility for each bid is nonnegative, i.e., Uni ≥ 0.
Computation Efficiency: The problem can be solved in polynomial time.
Among these three properties, truthfulness is the most challenging one to achieve. In order to
design a truthful auction mechanism, we introduce the following definitions.
Definition 1: (Monotonicity): If mobile user n wins with the bid ∆ni = {vni, εni, bni, Ani},
then mobile user n can win the bid with ∆nj = {vnj, εnj, bnj, Anj}  ∆ni = {vni, εni, bni, Ani}.
The notation  denotes the preference over bid pairs. Specifically, ∆nj = {vnj, εnj, bnj, Anj} 
∆ni = {vni, εni, bni, Ani} if εnj > εni for vnj = vni, bnj = bni, Anj = Ani or vnj < vni, bnj <
bni, Anj < Ani for εnj = εni. The monotonicity implies that the chance to obtain a required
bundle of resources can only be enhanced by either increasing the local accuracy or decreasing
the amount of resources required or decreasing the cost.
Definition 2: (Critical Value): For a given monotone allocation scheme, there exists a critical
value cni of each bid ∆ni such that ∀n, i(χni−vni) ≥ cni will be a winning bid, while ∀n, i(χni−
vni) < cni is a losing bid.
In our proposed mechanism, the difference between the satisfaction based on local accuracy and
cost of one bid can be considered as the value of that bid. Therefore, the critical value can be
seen as the minimum value that one bidder has to bid to obtain the requested bundle of resources.
With the concepts of monotonicity and critical value, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: An auction mechanism is truthful if the allocation scheme is monotone and each
winning mobile user is paid the amount that equals to the difference between the satisfaction
based on the local accuracy and the critical value.
Proof: Similar Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 in [11].
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In the next subsection, we propose a primal-dual greedy approximation algorithm for solving
problem P6. The algorithm iteratively updates both primal and dual variables and the approxi-
mation analysis is based on duality property. As the result, we firstly relax 1 ≥ xni ≥ 0 of P6
to have the linear programming relaxation (LPR) of P6. Then, we introduce the dual variable
vectors y, z and t corresponding to constraints (30b), (30c) and (30d) and we have the dual of
problem LPR of P6 can be written as
P7 : max
y,z,t
∑
n∈N
yn + zBmax + tAmax (31a)
s.t. yn + zAni + tBni ≥ qni,∀n, i, (31b)
yn ≥ 0,∀n, (31c)
z, t ≥ 0. (31d)
In Section V-B, we devise an greedy approximation algorithm and Section V-C, a theoretical
bound is achieved for the approximation ratio of the proposed algorithm.
B. Approximation Algorithm Design
In this section, we use a greedy algorithm to solve problem P6 The main idea of the greedy
algorithm is to allocate the resource to bidders with the larger normalized value. Specifically,
after collecting all the bids from the mobile users, the BS as the auctioneer sorts the bids in a
decreasing order of qni
sni
which is viewed as the normalized value of a bid, where sin = ηbBn+ηaAn
is a weighted sum of the number of different types of resources requested and qni = χni − vni
is value of bid ∆ni.
C. Approximation Ratio Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze approximation ratio of Algorithm 4. Our approach is to use the
duality property to derive a bound for approximation algorithm. We denote the optimal solution
and the optimal value of LPR of P6 as x∗ni and OPf . Furthermore, let OP and ϕ as the optimal
value of P6 and the primal value of P6 obtained by Algorithm 4. Our analysis consists of
two steps. First, Theorem 1 shows that Algorithm 4 generates a feasible solution to P7, and
Proposition 1 provides approximation factor.
Theorem 1: Algorithm 4 provides a feasible solution to P7.
Proof: We discuss the following three cases:
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Algorithm 4: The Greedy Approximation Algorithm
1 Input: (B,A, χ, v, Bmax, Amax)
2 Output: solution x
3 U = ∅, x = 0
4 ∀n : yn = 0, ψ = 0;
5 ϕ = 0, B = 0, A = 0;
6 sin = ηbBni + ηaAni;
7 qkj = χni − vni;
8 for n ∈ N do
9 in = arg maxi{qni};
10 end
11 κ = max sni
sni′
;
12 while N 6= ∅ do
13 µ = arg maxn∈N
qni
snin
;
14 if B + bµiµ <= Bmax and A+ aµiµ <= Amax then
15 xµiµ = 1; yµ = qµiµ;
16 ϕ = ϕ+ qµiµ ;
17 ψ =
∑
n∈U qnin∑
n∈U snin
;
18 U = U ∪ {µ} and N = N \ {µ}
19 else
20 break;
21 end
22 end
23 ψ¯ = κψ;
24 z = ηbψ¯, t = ηaψ¯
• Case 1: mobile user µ wins, i.e., µ ∈ U and bµiµ = maxi′∈Iµ{qµi′}. Then we have yµ =
qµiµ ≥ qµi′ ,∀i′ ∈ Iµ. Thus, constraint (31b) is satisfied for all mobile users in U .
• Case 2: mobile user µ loses the auction, i.e., µ ∈ N \U . According to the while loop, it is
evident that
qnin
snin
>
qµiµ
sµiµ
,∀n ∈ U .
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Therefore, ψ > qµiµ
sµiµ
. Thus,
ψ¯ ≥ κqµiµ
sµiµ
≥ qµiµ
sµiµ
.
In addition, we have
qµiµ ≥ qµi′ and κ >
sµiµ
sµi′
,∀i′ 6= iµ.
Therefore,
ψ¯ ≥ qµi′
nµi′
,∀i′ 6= iµ.
Therefore, we have
ηbψ¯Bin + ηaψ¯Ain ≥ qin,∀i′ 6= iµ.
or
zCin + tAin ≥ qin,∀i′ 6= iµ.
Therefore, constraint (31b) is also satisfied for all mobile users in N \ U .
Proposition 1: The upper bound of integrality gap α between P6 and its relaxation and the
approximation ratio of Algorithm 4 are 1 + κΥ
Υ−S , where Υ = ηbBmax + ηaAmax, S = maxn,i sni.
Proof: Let OP and OPf be the optimal solution for P6 and LPR of P6. We can obtain the
following:
OP ≤ OPf ≤
N∑
n=1
yn + zBmax + tAmax
≤
N∑
n=1
yn + ψ¯(ηbBmax + ηaAmax)
≤
∑
n∈N
qnin + ψ¯(ηbBmax + ηaAmax)
≤
(∑
n∈N
qnin
)(
1 +
(ηbBmax + ηaAmax)κ
ηbBmax + ηaAmax − S
)
≤ ϕ
(
1 +
Υκ
Υ− S
)
,
Therefore, the integrality α is given as
OPf/OP
≤ OPf/ϕ
≤
(
1 +
κΥ
Υ− S
)
.
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The approximation ratio is
OP/ϕ ≤ OPf/ϕ ≤
(
1 +
κΥ
Υ− S
)
.
D. Payment
Then we will find the critical value which is the minimum value a bidder has to bid to win
the requested bundle of resources. In this paper, we consider the bid combinations submitted
by mobile user n as the combinations of bid submit by virtual bidders, in which each virtual
bidder can submit one bid. Therefore, the number of virtual bidders corresponding to mobile
user n is equal to the number of bids In that mobile user n submits. Denote by m the losing
mobile user with the highest normalized value if mobile user n is not participating in the auction.
Accordingly, the minimum value mobile user n needs to place is qmim
smim
snin , where im and in are
the indexes of highest normalized value bids of mobile user m and n, respectively. Thus, the
payment of winning mobile user n in the pricing scheme is gnin = χnin − qmimsmim snin .
E. Properties
Now, we show that the winner determination algorithm is monotone and the payment deter-
mined for a winner mobile user is the difference between the local accuracy based satisfaction
and the critical value of its bid. From line 13 of the Algorithm 4, it is clear that a mobile user can
increase its chance of winning by increasing its bid. Also, a mobile user can increase its chance
to win by decreasing the weighted sum of the resources. Therefore, the winner determination
algorithm is monotone with respect to mobile user’s bids. Moreover, the value of a winning
bidder is equals to the minimum value it has to bid to win its bundle, i.e., its critical value.
This is done by finding the losing bidder m who would win if bidder n would not participate in
the auction. Thus, the proposed mechanism has a monotone allocation algorithm and payment
for the winning bidder equals to the difference between the local accuracy based satisfaction
and the critical value of its bid. We conclude that proposed mechanism is a truthful mechanism
according to Lemma 1.
Next, we prove that the proposed auction mechanism is individual rational. For any mobile
user n bidding its true value, we consider two possible cases:
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• If mobile user n is a winner with its bid ith, its payment is
Uni = gni − vni
= (χni − qmim
smim
sni − vni
=
(
χni − vni
sni
− qmim
smim
)
sni
=
(
qni
sni
− qmim
smim
)
sni ≥ 0
where m the losing bidder with the highest normalized valuation if n does not participate
in the auction and the last inequality follows from Algorithm 4.
• If mobile user n is not a winner. Its utility is 0.
Therefore, the proposed auction mechanism is individual rational.
Finally, we show that the proposed auction mechanism is computationally efficient. We can
see that in Algorithm 4, the while-loop (lines 12-22) takes at most N times, linear to input. Cal-
culating the payment takes at most N(N−1) times. Therefore, the proposed auction mechanism
is computationally efficient.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide some simulation results to evaluate the proposed mechanism.
The parameters for the simulation are set the following. The required CPU cycles for per-
forming a data sample cn is uniformly distributed between [10, 50] cycles/bit. The size of data
samples of each mobile user is sn = 800 × 103, the maximum tolerance time of a FL task
is Tmax = [100, 500]. The effective switched capacitance in local computation is ξ = 10−26.
We assume that the noise power spectral density level N0 is −174dBm/Hz, the sub-channel
bandwidth is W = 15 kHz and the channel gain is uniformly distributed between [−90,−95]
dB. In addition, the maximum and minimum transmit power of each mobile user is uniformly
distributed between [3, 6] mW and between [1, 2] mW, respectively. The maximum and minimum
computation capacity is uniformly distributed between [3, 5] GHz and between [0.1, 0.2] GHz,
respectively. We also assume that the total number of sub-channels and antennas of the BS are
100 and 100, respectively. Firstly, we use the iterative Algorithm 3 to perform the characteristic
of evaluating bids. The maximum number of sub-channels Bmaxn and antennas A
max
n for mobile
user n to request in each bid vary from 10 to 50. Fig. 2a shows the accuracy level that mobile
user n requires to provide decreases when the maximum number of sub-channels Bmaxn and
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Fig. 2: Numerical results a) The changing of the local accuracy when the maximum number sub-
channels and antennas in one bid vary, b) The changing of the energy cost when the maximum
number sub-channels and antennas in one bid vary.
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Fig. 3: Numerical results a) Local accuracy v.s. Tmax b) Energy cost v.s. Tmax
antennas Amaxn increase. However, the decreasing requested local accuracy of mobile user data
leads to the increase of global and local rounds to achieve global accuracy. As a result, the cost
increases when the number of sub-channels and antennas increases, as shown in Fig. 2b.
Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b present the cost of one bid of the mobile user and local accuracy,
respectively, when the maximum tolerance time Tmax varies from 100 to 500. When the maximum
tolerance time increases, the cost decreases. It is natural because mobile user n can keep low
contributing CPU cycle frequency and transmission rate while guaranteeing the delay constraint.
In the following, we evaluate the performance of the proposed auction algorithm. To compare
with the proposed algorithm, we use three baselines:
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Fig. 4: Numerical results for social welfare a) four schemes: Optimal solution, fractional optimal
solution, proposed greedy algorithm and lower bound b) three schemes: Optimal solution,
proposed greedy algorithm and fixed price scheme.
• Optimal Solution: P6 is solved optimally.
• Fractional Optimal Solution: the linear relaxation of P6 is solved optimally.
• Fixed Price Scheme [30]: In this scheme, price vector f = {fb, fa} is the vector that mobile
users need to pay for the resource. In this scheme, the mobile users are assumed to be served
in a first come, first served basic until the resources are exhausted. The mobile user can get
the resource when the valuation of mobile user’s bid is at least Fni = Bnifb +Anifa which
is the sum of the fixed price of each resource in its bid. We consider three kinds of price
vector: linear price (fi = fo× ηi, i = a, b), sub-linear price vector (fi = fo× η0.85i , i = a, b)
and a super linear price vector (fi = fo×η1.15i , i = a, b). Here, we call fo as the basic price.
Unless specified otherwise, we choose fo = 0.01.
Fig. 4a reports the performance of the optimal solution, the fractional optimal solution, the
lower bound, and the proposed greedy scheme. The lower bound is determined by the fractional
optimal solution divided by gap when the number of mobile users varies from 10 to 50. We
note that with the number of mobile users increasing, all schemes produce higher social welfare.
This is because there is more chances to choose winning bids with the higher value. Although
the social welfare obtained through the proposed greedy scheme is lower than through optimal
solution and fractional optimal solution, it much higher than the lower bound.
Fig. 4b shows the social cost achieved by optimal solution, the proposed greedy scheme and
fixed linear scheme when the number of mobile users varies from 10 to 50. We can see that
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Fig. 5: Numerical results for social welfare when a) ηa = 1, ηb = 0.5 , b) ηa = 1, ηb = 1, c)
ηa = 1, ηb = 2.
the proposed greedy scheme can provide the much higher social welfare than the fixed linear
scheme.
Since the fixed price scheme heavily depends on the prices of resources, the next experiment
helps us to decide whether the fixed-price vector or the performance of the proposed mechanisms
is better when we change the basic price fo between [0.01, 0.31] with the step is 0.03. Fig. 5a,
Fig. 5b and Fig. 5c show that the social welfare of fixed price firstly increases and then decreases
and equal to 0 when the initial price increases. This is because when the basic price becomes too
high, the sum of the price is higher than the valuation of the resources claimed in a bid. Moreover,
the social welfare achieved by linear, sublinear and superlinear price schemes are lower than by
the proposed greedy scheme. This proves our proposed auction scheme outperforms the fixed
price scheme.
In Fig. 6a, Fig. 6b and Fig. 6c, we observe the metrics: social welfare, resource utilization and
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Fig. 6: Numerical results for normalized ratio when a) ηa = 1, ηb = 0.5 , b) ηa = 1, ηb = 1, c)
ηa = 1, ηb = 2.
percentage of three schemes: optimal solution, greedy proposed scheme and fixed price schemes
with linear (Fig. 6a), sublinear (Fig. 6b), superlinear (Fig. 6c) fixed price vector. We perform
in terms of the ratio with proposed greedy scheme. Among these schemes, the optimal solution
is the highest in terms of all metrics. Compared with the proposed scheme, the fixed price can
utilize more resources and more mobile users but provides less social welfare. This is due to
the fact that the fixed price mechanism heavily depends on the prices of the resources.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper focus on the incentive mechanism design to stimulate mobile users to participate
in FL. We formulated the incentive problem between the BS and mobile users in the FL
service market as the auction game with the objective of maximizing social welfare. Then,
we presented the method for mobile users to decide the bids submitted to the BS so that
mobile users can minimize the energy cost. We also proposed the iterative algorithm with low
complexity. In addition, we proposed a primal-dual greedy algorithm to tackle the NP-hard
winner selection problem. Finally, we showed that the proposed auction mechanism guarantee
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truthfulness, individual rationality and computation efficiency. Simulation results demonstrated
the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism where social welfare obtained by our proposed
mechanism is 400% larger than by the fixed price scheme.
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